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The present volume consists of a collection of papers originally presented at the 
conference Conventional Principles in Science, held at the University of Bristol, August 2011, 
which featured contributions on the history and contemporary development of the notion 
of ‘relativized a priori’ principles in science, from Henri Poincaré’s conventionalism to 
Michael Friedman’s contemporary defence of the relativized a priori. In Science and 
Hypothesis, Poincaré assessed the problematic epistemic status of Euclidean geometry and 
Newton’s laws of motion, famously arguing that each has the status of ‘convention’ in 
that their justification is neither analytic nor empirical in nature. In The Theory of Relativity 
and A Priori Knowledge, Hans Reichenbach, in light of the general theory of relativity, 
proposed an updated notion of the Kantian synthetic a priori to account for the dynamic 
inter-theoretic status of geometry and other non-empirical physical principles. 
Reichenbach noted that one may reject the ‘necessarily true’ aspect of the synthetic a 
priori whilst preserving the feature of being constitutive of the object of knowledge. Such 
constitutive principles are theory-relative, as illustrated by the privileged role of non-
Euclidean geometry in general relativity theory. This idea of relativized a priori principles 
in spacetime physics has been analysed and developed at great length in the modern 
literature in the work of Michael Friedman, in particular the roles played by the light 
postulate and the equivalence principle – in special and general relativity respectively – in 
defining the central terms of their respective theories and connecting the abstract 
mathematical formalism of the theories with their empirical content. The papers in this 
volume guide the reader through the historical development of conventional and 
constitutive principles in science, from the foundational work of Poincaré, Reichenbach 
and others, to contemporary issues and applications of the relativized a priori concerning 
the notion of measurement, physical possibility, and the interpretation of scientific 
theories. 
 
The first step towards the development of the relativized a priori is taken by 
Poincaré’s modification of the Kantian epistemic categories in order to accommodate the 
special status of geometry. Given the construction of consistent geometric systems that 
negate axioms of Euclidean geometry, Poincaré notes that the Kantian idea of Euclidean 
geometry being necessarily true is not tenable. However, Euclidean geometry does play 
an important constitutive role in the physical systems in which it is employed, and in this 
sense retains a key feature of a prioricity. Though geometry is constitutive, it can no 
longer be regarded as uniquely imposed upon us since we are left with freedom to employ 
distinct geometries. In the first paper of the issue, ‘Conventionalism, Structuralism and 
Neo-Kantianism in Poincaré’s Philosophy of Science,’ Milena Ivanova analyses the 
nature of Poincaré’s conventionalism and its implications for his philosophy of science, in 
particular his neo-Kantian structuralism. Ivanova identifies three main ‘conventionalist’ 
positions associated with Poincaré’s writings: conventionalism as general instrumentalist 																																																								
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philosophy of science; conventionalism as a response to the underdetermination of 
geometry by experience; and conventionalism as an epistemic category that accounts for 
the status of constitutive principles in science. Ivanova argues that Poincaré’s 
conventionalism is best understood as an epistemological thesis concerning the status of 
geometry, and not as a global instrumentalism, and considers the role of conventions in 
Poincaré’s wider philosophy of science. In particular, Ivanova focuses on the Kantian 
aspect of Poincaré’s epistemology, of which geometric conventionalism is key, and how it 
shapes his structuralist philosophy of science. Regarding the problem of theory change, 
Ivanova points at passages where Poincaré explicitly denies the arbitrariness of aesthetic 
values and regards values such as simplicity as regulative ideals in science. The choice 
between alternative geometries, then, for Poincaré whilst guided by considerations of 
convenience is not arbitrary and is rationally justified. Finally, Ivanova builds on 
Friedman’s (1999) interpretation of Poincaré’s views on the constitutive elements in 
science, seen as non-arbitrary conventions, showing how this position fits with Poincaré’s 
overall views regarding the aim of science.  
 
Coordinating principles are predominantly taken to function as general mediating 
principles connecting the mathematical formalism of a theory to the empirical data. 
Flavia Padovani’s contribution, ‘Measurement and the relativized a priori,’ investigates 
whether the relativized a priori functions solely at the level of scientific principles, or if it 
also plays a more basic role in providing access to phenomena. Padovani explores 
Reichenbach’s original thoughts on the role of constitutive principles as developed in his 
early work, in particular his doctoral dissertation. In this early work, Reichenbach is 
concerned not only with the question of coordination between abstract mathematical 
structure and the world via general constitutive principles, but with the more basic 
question of how we ascribe meaning to concepts that relate to our ability to measure 
what Reichenbach terms “real things”. Padovani argues that the importance of 
Reichenbach’s insight here has been overlooked in the contemporary development of the 
relativized a priori. For Reichenbach, coordinating principles function on different levels: 
(1) at the level of general scientific principles that aid to give a theory its empirical 
meaning, and (2) at a more basic level of individuation and measurement of physical 
quantities (for example, theoretical terms such as temperature become meaningful only 
after we have related them to specific measurement procedures). Padovani’s contribution 
motivates the further development of how to integrate measurement procedures into a 
‘levelled’ notion of relativized a priori. It also calls us to consider the role played by 
constitutive principles in theory change. While on the accepted account of relativized a 
priori the change of general constitutive principles implies the revision of the entire 
framework, coordinating measurement procedures are usually carried over to the new 
framework, as indicated by concept of temperature, allowing for continuity at this more 
basic level.  
 
 The constitutive principles in scientific theories range from the basic mathematical 
language used (e.g. linear algebra, calculus, geometries, manifold theories) to coordinative 
principles that connect the mathematical formalism to measurable physical properties for 
which the theories aim to account. Ryan Samaroo’s contribution, ‘Friedman’s Thesis,’ 
focuses on this distinction between mathematical and coordinating principles and 
contends that treating such principles as different in kind, with only the latter as properly 
constitutive, strengthens Friedman’s case against Quinean epistemological holism by 
helping to dispel worries that purely mathematical principles and coordinative principles 
are on a par with regards to confirmation. The central contention of Samaroo’s paper is 
that, contra Friedman, neither Riemannian manifolds nor the equivalence principle are 
properly constitutive in general relativity, insofar as they are not coordinating principles 
connecting physico-mathematical structure to empirical claims, but rather just part of the 
mathematical background of general relativity. This distinction is quite fine – Friedman 
holds that Riemann’s theory of manifolds is constitutive of general relativity insofar as 
without it “the space-time structure of [general relativity] is not even logically possible” 
(Friedman 2001, p. 39; emphasis ours). Samaroo notes that this sense of constitutivity is 
of a different kind from that of coordinating principles, which rather than giving a logical 
space for scientific inquiry, play a mediating role between the mathematics and physical 
systems. Samaroo’s ‘rational reconstruction’ of the formulation of general relativity 
highlights the coordinative role of the geodesic principle and non-coordinative roles of 
Riemannian manifolds and the weak equivalence principle. 
 
 The complex role played by constitutive principles in the conceivability and 
physical interpretation of four-dimensional spacetime in general relativity is further 
explored in Jonathan Everett’s contribution, ‘The constitutive a priori and the distinction 
between mathematical and physical possibility.’ Everett focuses on the sense in which 
purely mathematical possibilities become physical possibilities in science, in particular on 
the Kantian aspects in Friedman’s account of the development of general relativity.  
Everett considers the role of regulative principles in scientific progress and their relation 
to constitutive principles, which he argues add physical content to the theory but should 
not be understood as making mathematical possibilities physical. In particular, Everett 
argues that the rotating frame thought experiment, which plays a key role in Friedman’s 
account of constitutivity, should rather be understood in regulative terms. Doing so, 
Everett promotes Cassirer’s account of the development of spacetime theories in terms of 
regulative principles as a viable Kantian alternative to Reichenbachian constitutivity-
based accounts (such as Friedman’s). Everett addresses a key concern for regulativity-
based accounts – that it requires an independent faculty of sensibility in order for 
regulative and constitutive principles to be differentiated – by focusing on Cassirer’s 
account of objectivity. Cassirer takes objectivity to be a regulative ideal of scientific 
enquiry, with Everett highlighting that this can be understood in terms the invariant 
structure of a theory, such that science achieves greater objectivity via the broadening of 
symmetry groups. 
 
 The role of symmetry groups in scientific progress is the topic of the final paper of 
the volume. Adam Caulton’s contribution, ‘The role of symmetry in the interpretation of 
physical theories,’ considers the function of symmetries in a theory and their role in how 
the theory is taken to represent the world. The symmetries of a theory mark the class of 
transformations to the theory’s space of possible states under which it is preserved. 
Symmetries standardly present an interpretative dilemma. On the one hand, symmetries 
mark a redundancy in the theory in that the theory has greater mathematical structure 
than is required to account for the world and ought to be deemed physically insignificant, 
as famously debated in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence in the case of absolute space. 
On the other hand, there is a non-trivial and apparently physically significant aspect of 
symmetries in which they appear to relate distinct physically possible states that happen 
to be empirically indistinguishable. Caulton argues that our understanding of which 
symmetries of a theory are physically significant informs the interpretation of the theory 
and our understanding of which symmetries play a constitutive role in the theory. Central 
to Caulton’s analysis is the distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ symmetries, 
loosely analogous to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions central to 
the logical empiricism of Carnap and others. Symmetries of formalism, where multiple 
distinct mathematical states represent a single physical state (also known as gauge 
symmetries in the literature) are labeled ‘analytic’ in that they are (1) ‘empty’ of physical 
content, and (2) hold independently of any contingent matters of fact (i.e. independently 
of the state of the world). The synthetic symmetries of a theory, conversely, are physically 
significant in that they hold of transformations that generate a physical difference. As 
such, a theory’s analytic symmetries partition its state space into classes of ‘physically 
equivalent’ mathematical states. As with relativized a priori principles in general, certain 
symmetries can be analytic (non-physical) in the context of one theory and synthetic 
(physically significant) in another; for instance, the transitioning of the Galilei and 
Lorentz groups from synthetic to analytic symmetries are marks of scientific progress due 
to the recognition and elimination of surplus structure. Caulton proposes that the set of 
analytic symmetries ought to be maximized as much as empirical adequacy allows.  
 
 The role of conventional and constitutive principles in science continues to 
generate much discussion in the literature and open new questions about the 
epistemology and aims of science. We see in this special issue that many interpretative 
issues concerning the relativized a priori remain, both regarding historical episodes in the 
development of theories and in contemporary issues in the foundations of science. 
Moreover, whereas the role of relativized a priori principles in science has predominantly 
been analysed using case studies from fundamental physics, particularly spacetime 
theories, it is clear that they have a much wider role in scientific enterprise, for instance in 
the special sciences. We take it that the research program has much life ahead.5 
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